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Individual differences have been addressed by many authors in social sciences, however personality has been neglected. The
purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of personality in social decision-making situations. Prior researches on the role
of personality either focused on how personality influences social and economic preferences or on the link between personality
and influence in social decision-making. The present thesis intends to combine these two aspects with the help of a secondary
analysis of a bargaining experiment. To test personality, the Five Factor Model was included and social preferences were
measured with the help of social value orientation. The findings show that two personality dimensions (Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness) indicate social preferences and four personality dimensions (Agreeableness, Extraversion, Neuroticism,
and Conscientiousness) influence the ability to use structural power. Furthermore, it has been found that the link of personality
and bargaining behavior is moderated by social preferences. The findings of the present thesis provide various theoretical and
empirical implications for personality psychology, human resource management, and organizational behavior.
Keywords: Social decision-making; fairness; personality; Five Factor Model; social value orientation.
1. Introduction
1.1. Forward to the topic
"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there
are evidently some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortune of others, and
render his happiness necessary to him, though
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of
seeing it" (Smith, 1976, p. 9).
Contrary to the thought of Adam Smith, traditional eco-
nomic assumption of self-interest predicts that people aim for
as high payoff for them as possible and do not care about oth-
ers’ payoff. Nevertheless, this assumption is not supported by
empirical data; experimental results show that individuals do
not act (completely) selfish but are ready to be fair and dis-
tribute goods in a more or less equal way. For example, in
his meta-study about the dictator game, Engel (2011) found
that dictators offer on average 30% of the pie. But what moti-
vates individuals to care about others’ payoff? Why are some
people willing to give up some of their own payoff and act in
a fair way? Why do others prefer maximizing their own pay-
off? A growing interest in the interface between economics
and psychology, both on the theoretical and empirical level, is
noticeable to answer these questions (Zhao & Smillie, 2015).
Individual differences, such as risk-aversion, time preference
or altruism have been measured and used by economists and
are included in economic models. Nonetheless, personality
traits are still neglected (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman,
& Ter Weel, 2008), although they differ from the above-
mentioned parameters in terms of being provably stable dur-
ing adulthood and are not situationally determined (McCrae
& John, 1992). According to Borghans et al. (2008), the ori-
gin and stability of personality traits are better understood
and more extensively studied than the parameters used by
economists and hence, they support the use of personality
traits.
Greenberg and Baron (2008, p. 141) defined individ-
ual differences as “the ways in people differ from one an-
other”. Furthermore, individuals differ in their preferred ap-
proach to solve a problem (Huitt, 1992). Economic prefer-
ences, temper, and personality are all considered individual
differences and play a role in problem solving and decision-
making. Many of these decision-making situations happen
in social context, where social interactions cannot be avoided
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(Sanfey, 2007). According to Hutzinger (2014), not every in-
dividual has the same influence of decision outcomes; some
of them are more influential than others. The ability to in-
fluence social decision-making situations can be also catego-
rized as individual difference.
Lately, the role of personality has gained popularity in
economic psychology, management studies and experimen-
tal economics (McCannon & Stevens, 2017). Studies state
that measuring personality types helps explaining and pre-
dicting the outcomes of bargaining (Barry & Friedman, 1998;
Boone, De Brabander, & Van Witteloostuijn, 1999; McCannon
& Stevens, 2017). Rustichini, DeYoung, Anderson, and Burks
(2012) showed that personality traits predict not only the
outcomes of decision-making situations in laboratories but
also the real-world socioeconomic outcomes. Moreover, they
found that personality traits are more suitable for prediction
of e.g. credit score or job persistence than economic prefer-
ences. Thus, personality traits should not be neglected but
rather seen as useful tools for better understanding decision-
making situations.
1.2. Purpose and relevance of the thesis
It is commonly recognized that personality matters in so-
cial decision-making. However, questions still arise about the
exact impact of personality and personality traits. In current
literature, two distinct directions regarding the role of per-
sonality are markable: 1) personality influences economic
and social preferences (e.g. Boyce, Czajkowski, & Hanley,
2019; Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014; Koole, Jager, van den
Berg, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001) and 2) personality has an impact
on negotiation process and outcome (e.g. Barry & Friedman,
1998; McCannon & Stevens, 2017). In my thesis, I intend to
combine these two aspects of the role of personality and so,
the primary research question is formulated as following:
How and to what extent do personality traits
influence allocation decisions in networks (de-
pending on power)?
In order to answer this research question, I conduct a
secondary analysis of a laboratory bargaining experiment,
and personality will be included as explanatory variable. Ac-
cording to Zhao and Smillie (2015) bargaining games are
suitable for exposing basic social preferences. In previous
laboratory experiments where the link between personality
traits and decision-making outcomes was examined, eco-
nomic games were played with two people (e.g. Barry &
Friedman, 1998; Brandstätter & Königstein, 2001; McCan-
non & Stevens, 2017). However, in my thesis I focus on
networks of three people and the design also enables to take
the role of power into consideration. Hence, my aim is to
better understand how different personality traits influence
social preferences and the use of structural power for achiev-
ing their preferred outcome.
As stated in Greenberg and Baron (2008), working
groups have gained more popularity in every types of or-
ganizations. People in working groups often have to reach
an agreement or make a common decision, however they in-
dividually differ in their preferences and abilities. Researches
show that personality relates to job and team performance
and thus, it should be not neglected in management studies
either (Greenberg & Baron, 2008). The experimental de-
sign suits for simulating negotiation about scarce resources
among people where one party has more power (principal).
Thus, the thesis can provide useful insights also for human
resources management.
After this Introduction, which presents the background
and the relevance of the topic, the thesis is organized as fol-
lowing: Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of the-
ories, concepts, and empirical findings related to individual
differences in social decision-making focusing on the role of
personality. The research model and the hypotheses are pre-
sented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 summarizes the research de-
sign and method. Additionally, a short review of the sample
is given. The testing and detailed analysis of the data (with
tables) are presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 the results of
the data analysis are discussed in depth, complemented with
some criticism. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the main find-
ings of the thesis. Besides, theoretical and practical signifi-
cance and implication of the thesis is discussed. Ultimately,
the limitations of the study are noted.
2. Literature review
2.1. Social decision-making
Huitt (1992, p. 34) defines decision making as “a selec-
tion process where one of two or more possible solutions in
chosen to reach a desired goal.” Predicting the outcome of
decisions-making situations is never easy due to the involved
uncertainty. This uncertainty derives from the adapting be-
havior (people fit their behavior to the changing social envi-
ronment) and from regarding what consequences these de-
cisions have on others (Lee, 2008). Furthermore, not ev-
ery individual has the ability to influence the outcome of
the group decisions equally. By manipulating and misrep-
resenting information, people can achieve higher influence
on group outcomes (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). This chapter
offers a literature overview starting with different theories
of social decision-making and then focuses on individual dif-
ferences in economics, psychology, and negotiation studies.
Finally, the role of personality is discussed in depth and the
Five Factor Model is presented.
2.1.1. Social impact theory
As a human being, we cannot be completely and perfectly
independent from other human beings. We may fear some
people, or admire others. Our everyday life is influenced by
people around us. Latané (1981) calls this social impact, and
concretely defines it as “changes in psychological states and
subjective feelings, motives and emotions, cognitions and be-
liefs, values and behavior, that occur in an individual, human
or animal, as a result of the real, implied, or imagined pres-
ence or action of other individuals” (Latané, 1981, p. 343).
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Moreover, he provides a general theory of social impact: he
identified three key variables: strength, immediacy, and the
number of sources. Strength is the sum of factors (such as age,
status, power) that determine how influential the source is.
Under immediacy we understand the distance in space/time
and the possible intervening factors. Finally, the number of
sources gives the number of people involved. Three princi-
ples, based on the three key variables, shade the theory in
more details; Principle 1 (Social Forces) says that social im-
pact (I) is equal with the multiplicative function of the three
variables. Principle 2 (The Psychosocial Law) declares that the
first person makes greater impact than the hundredth, so a
marginally decreasing effect exists. Finally, according to Prin-
ciple 3 (Multiplication Versus Division of Impact), not only the
multiplicative function of sources, but also the multiplicative
function of targets has effect on the impact (Latané, 1981).
Sedikides and Jackson (1990) empirically tested the va-
lidity of Social Impact Theory. A field experiment was con-
ducted in the Bronx Zoo, where an experimenter was dressed
either as a zoo keeper or in casual dress (and thus, it is pos-
sible to control for strength since a zoo keeper has more au-
thority and power), who asked visitors not to lean on the
railing. Moreover, the size of the groups of visitors was var-
ied (control variable for number of sources). Immediacy was
also included since the behavior of visitors was measured im-
mediately after the message and then later. Sedikides and
Jackson (1990) found that people followed the rule better if
it came from someone dressed as a zoo keeper, acted prop-
erly immediately after the message, and finally, fewer people
in smaller groups leaned on the railing than in bigger groups.
These empirical results partially support Social Impact The-
ory since evidence for the more complex predictions of the
theory were not found (Sedikides & Jackson, 1990).
2.1.2. Social decision scheme theory
The general theory of social decision scheme proposed by
Davis (1973) fundamentally addresses the following ques-
tion: How do individual preferences aggregate and end in a
group response (Stasser, 1999). Group decisions are char-
acterized by the diversity in preferences among the involved
people and how these diverse preferences will be recog-
nized and included in the group outcome (Davis, 1973).
Under social decision scheme Davis (1973) understands a
decision rule, which rule guides the social decision-making
process. Many existing groups work with formal social deci-
sion schemes, e.g. different voting rules like majority wins,
other groups aim to reach consensus instead of voting rules
(Davis, 1973). Davis (1973) theory works as a general group
decision-making model. First, r randomly selected group
members form individual preferences for a set of n mutually
exclusive and exhaustive alternatives A1, A2, . . ., An (Davis,
1973). These individual preferences can be expressed by a
probability distribution p1, p2, . . ., pn across the alternatives
(Davis, 1973). Because of the complexity of social processes
such as influence, dominance, equity, etc., “group decisions
are treated probabilistically” (Davis, 1973, p. 101). With
other words, even when the individual preference is known,
this preference will be chosen by the group only with some
probability (Davis, 1973). Social decision scheme can be
described as a social norm, which transforms interactions
towards a group decision. Davis (1973) differentiated be-
tween social decision schemes such as “majority”, “plurality’,
or “equiprobability”. The rule of majority dictates that the
majority in individual preference will determine the group
response, equiprobability means that every individual prefer-
ence has the same probability to be selected (Davis, 1973). It
is possible to use social decision-making schemes combined
(Davis, 1973).
In his original theory, Davis (1973) does not regard in-
termember differences; individual influence is not taken into
account (every member is equally able to influence the group
decision), and group members are pictured as indistinguish-
able and interchangeable (Kirchler & Davis, 1986). Since
this initial approach could not explain every aspect of group
processes and outcomes (Davis, 1973), Kirchler and Davis
(1986) proposed seeing group members as distinguishable.
This new approach made it possible to consider individual
differences such as personality or expertise (Bonner, 2000).
Moreover, not every group member influences group out-
come in the same way; some of them are more influential
than others (Hutzinger, 2014). Including individual ability
to influence others is not the only development of the origi-
nal theory: Hinsz (1999) extended the model for continuous
decisions such as quantities.
2.2. Individual differences in social decision-making
People can differ in many different ways from temper
to learning style. However, in social decision-making two
types of individual differences are salient: social influence
and social preference. As proposed by Latané (1981), not
every source is equally influential. The differences in indi-
vidual influence define how well people can enforce their
will (based on their preferences) in groups. Regarding so-
cial preferences, as mentioned in the Introduction, based on
the traditional economic theory, a self-maximizing behavior
is expected (which, in this case would mean that the player in
power position demands a very high payoff for him) but em-
pirical results (e.g. Andreoni, Brown, & Vesterlund, 2002;
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986) do not support that
people only want to maximize their profit and do not care
about fairness; on the contrary, people not only want to be
treated and treating others fairly but are ready to resist un-
fair firms, even if it costs some money. According to Rabin
(1993), if the intention of an action is nice then the action
itself is considered fair. On the other hand, a hostile inten-
tion is perceived as an unfair action (Rabin, 1993). More-
over, Rabin proposed the theory of reciprocity in 1993, which
claims the people tend to reward fair intentions and pun-
ish unfair intentions. Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) also de-
nies that motivation is based on only maximizing own profit
and highlight the importance of social preferences in eco-
nomics. Social preferences mean that people “are not solely
motivated by material self-interest, but also care positively
or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference
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agents” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002, C1). Fehr and Schmidt
(1999, p. 819) modeled fairness “as self-centered inequality
aversion”. Under inequality aversion we understand that in-
dividuals willingly give up some of their own payoff in order
to create a more equal distribution of goods since they dis-
like an unequal distribution (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). How-
ever, inequality aversion can derive from egoistic intention “if
people do not care per se about inequality that exists among
other people but are only interested in the fairness of their
own material payoff relative to the payoff of others” (Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999, p. 819). Of course, altruistic behavior can
be observed not only in laboratory experiments but also in
real life; people donate money to charity projects, help their
neighbor or old people. Rabin (1993) defines altruism as
caring about the well-being of others.
2.2.1. Individual differences in economics
Social preferences are usually measured in economic
games (Kainz, 2013) with the help of game theory, which is
a widely used tool in different disciplines to model, among
others, social decision-making situations (Camerer, 2003;
Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Under economic games we under-
stand decision-making tasks which illustrate strategic situ-
ations (Camerer, 2003; Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Economic
games have clearly demonstrated that people do not act as
the so-called homo oeconomicus; the overall rational and
completely self-interested agent with perfect information.
This neoclassical economic approach expects free riding and
maximizing own profit. One of the most famous economic
experiments is the dictator game by Güth, Schmittberger,
and Schwarze (1982), which game was a pioneer in terms
of contradicting the theory of exclusively self-interest man
(Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). Later on, by conducting other ex-
periments (such as Dictator Game, Gift Exchange Game or
Trust Game) more and more evidence was found for the
existence of other-regarding preferences. Other-regarding
preferences mean that one’s utility function counts not only
on his own payoff, but also on other people’s payoff (Fehr &
Schmidt, 2006). Fehr and Schmidt (2006) identified three
models of other-regarding preference: social preferences,
interdependent preferences, and intention-based reciprocity.
First, models of social preferences are based on the assump-
tion the one’s utility function depends on other’s payoff in
his reference group (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). Taking social
preferences into account, agents are considered rational and
thus, traditional utility and game theory is applicable (Fehr
& Schmidt, 2006). Models of interdependent preferences
assume that people also care about the type of their partner;
an originally altruistic player adapts to his selfish player and
also starts acting in a self-maximizing way (Fehr & Schmidt,
2006). Finally, intention-based reciprocity models include
the intention of players. Intention differs for the type of
the player (altruistic or egoistic); intention can be kind or
hostile (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). Including intention results
in more than one equilibrium and thus, the framework of
psychological game theory is necessary (Fehr & Schmidt,
2006).
People do not always act in the same way. An altruis-
tic person, who stays altruistic towards to other altruistic in-
dividuals, can become hostile towards to hostile individuals
since fairness “allows” to hurt someone who does not act
nicely (Rabin, 1993). Moreover, there exist evidences that
people exploit their bargaining power in competitive market
but not in bilateral bargaining situations (Fehr & Schmidt,
1999; Kainz, 2013) and thus, fairness is situation-dependent.
Furthermore, the intention behind fairness is often ambigu-
ous. Van Dijk, De Cremer, and Handgraaf (2004) examined
the difference between self-centered and altruistic fairness
and found that proself individuals often strategically use fair-
ness in order to maximize their own payoff.
Concluded, other-regarding preferences do not explain
every single aspects of social decision-making outcome. As
De Dreu and Gross (2019, p. 214) write; “people system-
atically differ in how they self-select into, perceive, and
act in particular situations”. The main difference between
economics and psychological approach is that psychologists
focus on individual behavior and differences, meanwhile
economists examine group outcomes (Kainz, 2013). As Kainz
(2013, p. 32) states in his doctoral dissertation, “psychology
in indispensable in order to understand economic behavior
since it helps describing and explaining the behavior of the
individual”. Recently, use of psychology in economic in eco-
nomic models has become more and more popular. Boyce
et al. (2019, p. 82) commented that “simple measures of
personality can help to explain economic values and choices
in a systematic way”. They also argued that personality can
be seen as standard socio-economics variables e.g. income
or education (Boyce et al., 2019).
2.2.2. Individual differences in psychology
In social psychology, fairness is closely related to altru-
istic, helping, and pro-social behavior, when people rather
cooperate than compete (Kainz, 2013). Social psycholo-
gists provide various explanations why people go beyond
self-interest: beliefs about others’ behavior, relationship char-
acteristics (e.g. trust), social norms, and social value orienta-
tions (Kainz, 2013). Out of these explanations social value
orientations can be categorized as individual difference and
thus, it will be discussed in depth.
Psychologists measure individual differences in social
motives with the help of the scale Social Value Orientation
(Kainz, 2013). According to Bogaert, Boone, and Declerck
(2008), people systematically differ in social preferences
(self-regarding versus other-regarding preferences), and dif-
ferences in social motives affect valuing cooperation and
cooperating behavior. Social value orientation theory en-
roots in the interdependence theory of Kelley and Thibaut
(n.d.). In this theory, situations are examined where the out-
come partially or completely depends on the action of others
(Kelley & Thibaut, n.d.). The framework of SVO classifies
people into types based on their social motives (Schwaninger,
Neuhofer, & Kittel, 2019). In 1968, Messick and McClintock
proposed three categories: prosocial (individuals care about
maximizing own and others’ outcome), individualistic (max-
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imizing own outcome), and competitive (maximizing the
relative difference between outcome for self and other). As
stated by Bogaert et al. (2008), the category prosocial is
sometimes divided into two sub-categories: altruistic (maxi-
mizing outcome for other) and reciprocal cooperators (only
cooperate when cooperation is also returned). According to
Messick and McClintock (1968), SVO is seen as a trait, which
demonstrates how people vary in what they believe fair or
unfair. Considering SVO as a trait means that it remains
stable (Bogaert et al., 2008; Van Dijk et al., 2004), however
it depends on situation and persons (Kainz, 2013). As Kainz
(2013) summarized Yamagishi’s findings (1995), even ego-
istic people cooperate if they trust others and consider the
consequences of non-cooperation in the long term.
In the literature, it is commonly recognized that SVO has
explanatory power on cooperative strategies, choices, and
motives (Bogaert et al., 2008). According to Bogaert et al.
(2008), SVO only defines the general willingness to cooper-
ate or not to cooperate but the actual behavior is mediated
by many contextual factors, such as trustworthiness. There-
fore, SVO resembles to personality traits in term of not being
independent from situational context.
2.2.3. Individual differences in negotiation approach
Study on negotiation is interdisciplinary and it has been
strongly influenced among others by game theory and later
by social psychology (L. L. Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010).
Negotiations occur very often both in private and business
life (Kainz, 2013). When people cannot achieve their goals
without cooperating with others, it is called negotiation
(L. L. Thompson et al., 2010). According to L. Thompson
(1990) negotiation has five characteristics: 1) negotiators
are aware of an interest conflict; 2) they are able to commu-
nicate; 3) compromises are available; 4) sending offers and
counteroffers is possible; 5) outcome is only determined if
it was accepted by all parties. Negotiation situations can be
divided into two categories based on how resources are han-
dled; integrative and distributive bargaining (L. Thompson,
1990). The main difference between them is, that “integra-
tive bargaining situations are non-zero-sum encounters in
which there is the possibility for joint gain from the negotia-
tion” Barry and Friedman (1998, p. 348), while in the case
of distributive bargaining a fixed amount of resources must
be distributed among the negotiators (Barry & Friedman,
1998). Distributive bargaining (with other words zero-sum
or fixed pie) is characterized by players having a reservation
value, which defines the smallest value one party is willing
to accept Barry and Friedman (1998). Regarding the moti-
vation of bargainers, Pruitt and Rubin (1986) proposed the
so-called dual concern model, which means that bargain-
ers are motivated by concerning their own outcome and by
concerning the outcome of other parties in the negotiation
(Van Dijk et al., 2004). This theory is based on two opposite
motives; fairness and self-interest (Van Dijk et al., 2004).
How much an individual is concerned with his own versus
others’ outcome varies from individual to individual.
Conventional wisdom suggests that some people natu-
rally have better abilities to negotiate than others and are
more successful. Hence, individual differences such as gen-
der, personality, intelligence, etc. have been examined also
in negotiation studies. These researches present ambiguous
result; lots of them emphasize that individual differences
play an important role in bargaining (e.g. Barry & Fried-
man, 1998; Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Bac-
caro, 2008; Falcão, Saraiva, Santos, & e Cunha, 2018; Mc-
Cannon & Stevens, 2017), others argue that individual differ-
ences do not predict consistent prediction of bargaining be-
havior (e.g. L. Thompson, 1990). After many years of incon-
sistent results, Elfenbein (2015) conducted a meta-analysis
and concluded that individual differences are indeed impor-
tant predictors in negotiations and should not be neglected
in future researches. Elfenbein (2015) found that the per-
formance of negotiators stayed consequently the same from
one encounter to the next, and thus, individual differences
do matter.
The role of power must be mentioned in negotiation stud-
ies. Power is defined as the ability to influence other people;
hence power is never an absolute value: someone’s individ-
ual power can be only interpreted as a relation to another
person’s individual power (Anderson & Thompson, 2004).
Power in negotiations can derive from different origins; An-
derson and Thompson (2004) distinguish between different
sources of power, such as authoritative power or when the
powerful individual is in the position to hurt the other party.
2.3. The role of personality
There are some individuals who are more egoistic and
others are more altruistic, some people are ready to cheat
meanwhile others stay honest. It indicates introducing fur-
ther explanatory factors; a plausible chose is personality. But
what is personality at all? Defining personality is not an easy
task; researchers from different schools have provided differ-
ent definitions during the years. Cattell, who represents the
trait-based approach, defines personality as “that which per-
mits a prediction of what a person will do in a given situation”
(Cattell, 1950, p. 2). The definition of behaviorist (another
school in personality psychology) provides a rather spare in-
terpretation and focuses on the behavior itself (Cloninger,
2009). Finally, the school of personological trait approach
takes both personality traits and the integration of the whole
person into consideration (Cloninger, 2009). The current
state of art interprets personality as a “resulting pattern of
habitual behaviors, cognitions, emotional patters” deriving
from environmental and biological factors” (Cloninger, 2009,
p. 5).
The idea of including personality as an explaining vari-
able in economic and bargaining games is not new. Brand-
stätter and Königstein (2001, p. 67) stated: “. . . it is worth-
while to take basic personality dimensions into account if one
tries to explain economic behavior in experimental games”.
The role of personality appears on two different levels: on the
one hand, personality influences economic choices (Boyce et
al., 2019), on the other hand, Barry and Friedman (1998)
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also emphasize the relevance of personality in order to bet-
ter understand negotiation processes and outcomes. It is im-
portant to notice that personality traits cannot be considered
independent from the economic environment, such as size
of quantity, first-mover advantage or asymmetrical informa-
tion (McCannon & Stevens, 2017). Measuring and including
personality has the advantage that personality remains sta-
ble during adultness and psychologist already recognized as
an effective predictor of behavior (Boyce et al., 2019). More-
over, measuring personality can be conducted in a simple way
by using well-established surveys (Boyce et al., 2019).
On the level of economic and social preferences, many
researches have proven that personality matters. Boone et
al. (1999) concluded that personality of players in Prisoner’s
Dilemma clearly matters. Moreover, time preferences are af-
fected by intelligence (which is part of the Openness dimen-
sion), and Neuroticism is related to risk preferences (Rusti-
chini et al., 2012). Boyce et al. (2019) found that personality
also shapes preferences toward status quo and sensitivity to
cost. Furthermore, personality influences social relationships
(Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998) and political voting behavior
(Schoen & Schumann, 2007). Hilbig et al. (2014) found that
personality also indicates social preferences, such as proso-
cial behavior. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2008)
likewise found that personality has an impact on social pref-
erences, more concretely on trust and reciprocity. Oda et al.
(2014) discovered that personality traits play a role in altru-
istic behavior in real life.
In negotiation studies, the influence of personality is also
supported (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Elfenbein et al., 2008;
McCannon & Stevens, 2017). Boyce et al. (2019, p. 201)
found a “multidimensional relationship between personal-
ity and situational variables”. According to McCannon and
Stevens (2017, p. 1166), “personality traits of individuals
contribute to the ability to predict bargaining outcome”. Tak-
ing personality into account can help organizations to per-
form better in negotiation situation (McCannon & Stevens,
2017). Hence, personality characteristics are useful to in-
clude in frameworks (McCannon & Stevens, 2017). Deuling,
Denissen, Van Zalk, Meeus, and Van Aken (2011) noticed that
personality has an impact on individual influence on group
decisions. However, is must be highlighted that personality
itself does not define individual influence and other factors
(e.g. cognitive ability, power) also play an important role
(Deuling et al., 2011).
2.3.1. Big Five
One of the most widely used tool for personality measure-
ment is the trait-based Five Factor Model from McCrae and
Costa (1989). In this model, five basic dimensions have been
discovered and are labeled as; Agreeableness, Extraversion,
Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Openness. These five
dimensions are now considered as a general taxonomy of per-
sonality dimensions (John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). Every
one of the dimensions stands for a continuum on which per-
sonality can be categorized (Hutzinger, 2014). Neuroticism,
for example, represents a scale from being anxious, insecure,
and nervous (people high in Neuroticism) to being stable and
calm (people low in Neuroticism) (John et al., 2008). Nev-
ertheless, it is important to mention that the Big Five model
does not explain the sources of the five dimensions but pro-
vides a description of personality (Rustichini et al., 2012).
As McCrae (2009, p. 148) stated, the structure of the
model “arises because the traits co-vary” and a consensus
among researchers was achieved that these five factors suit
well to cover the co-variation of most personality traits.
Hence, by using the Five Factor Model it is possible to avoid
overlooking important traits (McCrae, 2009). According to
Zhao and Smillie (2015, p. 279), “the five broad domains of
personality capture the basic structure of personality”. There
exists a hierarchical structure of personality traits related to
Big Five; it means that each domain of the Big Five contains
of various facet-level traits and every one of the domains can
be divided into two separate but correlated aspects, and these
aspects help predicting outcomes (Rustichini et al., 2012).
Zhao and Smillie (2015) state that the aspects and facets
have strong descriptive and predictive power of behavior.
Originally, psychologists applied the so-called lexical ap-
proach for studying personality (John et al., 2008). Using
dictionaries, descriptors of people were studied and catego-
rized. The Five Factor Model also derives from clustering
descriptors and thus, the dimensions are related to various
adjectives (John et al., 2008). Figure 1 illustrates which ad-
jectives are mostly related to the five dimensions (based on
John et al., 2008).
Agreeableness
Agreeableness is characterized by caring of other’s feeling
and needs (Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Moreover, people high
in Agreeableness are predicted to be flexible, good-natured,
tolerant and cooperative (Barrick & Mount, 1991). They
appreciate harmony with other people around them and
maintaining good relationship is important to the (De Dreu
& Gross, 2019). Low level of Agreeableness can lead to
conflicts between group members (Kramer, Bhave, & John-
son, 2014) and they tend to act unfriendly, uncooperative
(De Dreu & Gross, 2019), and suspicious (Schoen & Schu-
mann, 2007). Agreeableness is divided into Compassion
and Politeness (Rustichini et al., 2012). Moreover, lower-
level facets of Agreeableness contain altruism, modesty,
tender-mindedness, compliance, straightforwardness, and
trust (Zhao & Smillie, 2015).
Extraversion
Extraversion is related being talkative, sociable and out-
going (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Zhao & Smillie, 2015) and
predicts success in sales and management jobs (John et al.,
2008). Extraverted people get their energy from external
activities/situations, enjoy being around others (De Dreu &
Gross, 2019), and tend to be more active in group discussions
(Littlepage, Schmidt, Whisler, & Frost, 1995). Furthermore,
groups of solely extraverted people perform better at brain-
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Figure 1: Adjectives related to Big Five Dimensions
storming tasks (Kramer et al., 2014). According to Deuling
et al. (2011), Extraversion positively relates to leadership
effectiveness. Extraversion moderates the amount of time
spending in social interactions and size of the peer networks
(Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Koole et al. (2001) found the
Extraversion negatively relates to cooperation. Barry and
Friedman (1998) found that Extraversion is both an asset
and a liability depending the type of the negotiation. The
opposite of Extraversion is Introversion, which is character-
ized by being reserved, cautious, and even shy (Roccas, Sa-
giv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). The two aspects of Extraver-
sion are Assertiveness and Enthusiasm, where Assertiveness
reflects leadership, drive, and dominance and Enthusiasm
reflects positive emotions and sociability (Rustichini et al.,
2012).
Neuroticism
Neuroticism reflects a tendency to be anxious and eas-
ily frustrated (Kramer et al., 2014). Neuroticism is often
referred as emotional instability (De Dreu & Gross, 2019)
and decreases the willingness of taking risk (Rustichini et al.,
2012). People with high score on Neuroticism are more likely
to suffer in various psychiatric diseases (McCrae & John,
1992). Consistent differences between men and women
have been shown; females achieve higher score on Neuroti-
cism and Agreeableness than men (Deary, 2009). Generally,
highly neurotic people have a stronger desire to maintain
the status quo and are more loss-averse (Boyce et al., 2019).
Hutzinger (2014) and Deuling et al. (2011) independently
from each other found that Neuroticism negatively affects
individual influence on outcomes of group decisions.
Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness is connected to being responsible, re-
liable (Kramer et al., 2014), organized, and resourceful
(Schoen & Schumann, 2007). Low level of Conscientiousness
indicates lazy, immature, and impatient behavior (Schoen &
Schumann, 2007). It displays how people are able to “con-
trol, regulate, and direct their impulses” (De Dreu & Gross,
2019, p. 217). High Conscientiousness predicts good health
outcomes, longevity, and higher academic grade-point av-
erages (John et al., 2008). Moreover, it is a useful tool to
predict job performance, both in individual and in group set-
tings (Barry and Stewart, 1997). Conscientiousness is not an
“intrinsically interpersonal” trait (McCrae & Costa, 1989, p.
586), but being highly conscientious predicts frequent social
contact to family members under young adults (Asendorpf &
Wilpers, 1998). It may come from sense of duty and because
conscientious people are less like to be distracted by new
relationships (Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). The aspects of
Conscientiousness are identified as Orderliness and Industri-
ousness (Rustichini et al., 2012).
Openness
Openness shows tolerance of diversity (Schoen & Schu-
mann, 2007), intellectual curiosity, and vivid phantasy (Zhao
& Smillie, 2015). Highly open individuals have a tendency
to hold unconventional beliefs, be creative, and acknowledge
arts and beauty (De Dreu & Gross, 2019). On the other hand,
low level of openness indicates conventional, insensitive, and
down-to-earth behavior (Roccas et al., 2002). Openness has
been conceptualized into Intellect and Openness and “reflects
the ability and tendency to seek, detect, comprehend, and
utilize patterns of information, both sensory and abstract”
(Rustichini et al., 2012, p. 3).
2.3.2. Other personality taxonomies
Although the Big Five personality test is the most used
personal taxonomy, it has faced with critiques and re-
searchers proposed other personality taxonomies too. Here,
two other taxonomies are shortly presented, which also
gained popularity among researchers in negotiation stud-
ies and economics.
Just like the Five Factor Model, the HEXACO model is also
based on lexical approach (Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Addition-
ally, a sixth factor (Honesty-Humility) was added to the orig-
inal five factors (Hilbig et al., 2014). According to Ashton
and Lee (2007, p. 156) “Honesty-Humility represents the
tendency to be fair and genuine in dealing with others, in
the sense of cooperating with others even when one might
exploit them without suffering retaliation.” The dimension
Honesty-Humility is related to being sincere, honest, modest,
and fair-minded (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Some of the char-
acteristics of Honesty-Humility is part of the Agreeableness
dimension in Five Factor Model (Hilbig et al., 2014). How-
ever, the HEXACO Agreeableness differs from the Five Factor
Model Agreeableness: the HEXACO Agreeableness relates to
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tolerance and forgiveness rather than fairness (Ashton & Lee,
2007). FFM Agreeableness is a broader concept of proso-
cial behavior than HEXACO Agreeableness (Zhao & Smillie,
2015). Some researchers argue that Honesty-Humility suits
better to predict giving behavior in dictator game than Five
Factor Model Agreeableness (Hilbig et al., 2014). Extraver-
sion, Conscientiousness, and Openness are similar factors
in both taxonomies (Ashton & Lee, 2007). The Five Factor
Model dimension, Neuroticism is called Emotionality in the
HEXACO model and slightly differs from Neuroticism (Ash-
ton & Lee, 2007). However, both concepts can help under-
standing how individuals behave in mixed-motive social in-
teractions (Zhao & Smillie, 2015).
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, which is based on Jung’s
theory, was proposed by Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, and Ham-
mer (1998) and focuses on four preference dimensions: 1)
introversion- extraversion dimension (orientation of energy:
inner or outer world), 2) perceiving-judging dimension (at-
titude towards outer world), (3) feeling-thinking dimension
(judgment), and 4) sensing-intuition dimension (percep-
tion). The first dimension displays how much an individual
demonstrate interest in inner or outer world (McCannon &
Stevens, 2017). The second dimension represents the dif-
ference in the preferred way in decision making: by judge-
ment or by seeking additional information and perceiving
(McCannon & Stevens, 2017). The third dimension is dedi-
cated to the preference whether a person relies on thinking
or feeling when making a decision (McCannon & Stevens,
2017). The fourth dimension shows whether the perceiving
is done through senses or intuition (McCannon & Stevens,
2017). MBTI gained popularity mainly in the United States of
America and is widely used is consultancy (Furnham, 1996;
Swope, Cadigan, Schmitt, & Shupp, 2008). McCannon and
Stevens (2017, p. 1169) argued that “MBTI tools focus on
the components of the decision process which makes them
especially appropriate for studying game theoretic choice.”
Furnham (1996) examined the relationship between the Five
Factor Model and the MBTI instrument and found the follow-
ing correlations: Agreeableness correlates with the feeling-
thinking dimension, Extraversion strongly correlates with
the extraversion-introversion dimension, Conscientiousness
correlates both with the thinking-feeling and the judging-
perceiving dimension, Openness correlates with all of the
four dimensions, and Neuroticism does not correlate with
any of the dimensions in the MBTI instrument.
3. Research model, research question and hypotheses
The aim of my thesis is to examine the role of person-
ality in social decision-making situation; more concretely, in
distributive bargaining situation. In the literature, it is rec-
ognized that personality matters but there is no unity on how
exactly it matters. On the one hand, personality traits in-
fluence perceived fairness; some people act egoistic, others
behave fairly. On the other hand, personality also shapes
individuals’ ability to successfully achieve his will in negoti-
ation. Hence, humans obtain a pre-negotiation preference
based on their fairness attitude. According to the current
state of the literature, it is acknowledged that personality
has an impact on social preferences. Furthermore, it is also
commonly recognized that not every individual is equally in-
fluential. Therefore, not every individual is capable to push
through his pre-negotiation social preference and use struc-
tural power. Based on these findings, I propose the following
research model: 1) personality as independent variable in-
fluences bargaining behavior (dependent variable) and how
well an individual can push through his will, 2) personality
(IV) also affects social preferences and 3) social preferences
have an impact on bargaining behavior and thus, function
as mediator. This research model is a combination of two,
so far, distinct research paths: the relationship between per-
sonality and social preferences and the relationship between
personality and bargaining behavior. In my thesis, I focus on
different personality traits from the Five Factory Model and
on what impact these five factors have on bargaining behav-
ior and social preferences.
3.1. Research question
In relation to the above notion, the primary research
question is the following:
• How and to what extent do personality traits influ-
ence allocation decisions in networks (depending on
power)?
Moreover, I intend to answer the following sub-questions:
• Which personality traits influence social preferences?
• Is there any connection between personality traits and
the tendency for using power position? Of course, by
using power position I do not mean maximizing own
pay-off. Some individuals prefer equal distribution and
can use their power for this purpose.
• Are some personality types influenced more by time
pressure? Is it visible when taking a look at the out-
comes? Some people may make worse decision under
pressure and cannot enforce their will.
• Who are the “tough negotiators”? By tough negotiator
I mean those, who send extreme first offers in order to
use first-mover advantage.
After answering all these questions, I expect to obtain an
overview of the topic and additionally, unfold some hidden
interdependencies. Combining the two aspects of the role
of personality may provide additional and new insight about
mixed-motive social decision-making situations.
3.2. Hypotheses
Agreeableness and Extraversion are the two most signif-
icant dimensions to interpersonal behavior (Zhao & Smillie,
2015), which means that highly altruistic and extravert in-
dividuals care a lot about social relationships. Intuitively,
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Figure 2: Research model
Agreeableness seems to be the most relevant factor for bar-
gaining outcomes. Empirical evidences also support the
Agreeableness is linked to prosocial and altruistic behav-
ior (Baumert, Schlösser & Schmitt, 2014). Roccas et al.
(2002) linked altruism with conformity values and argued
that highly agreeable people do not want to violate norms.
According to Zhao and Smillie (2015), Agreeableness is
linked to sending equal offers. Barry and Friedman (1998)
found that Agreeableness is a liability in distributive bar-
gaining situations since highly agreeable humans lack the
necessary pursuit of self-interest. Moreover, individuals with
high score on the Agreeableness scale are more likely to be
anchored by extreme first offers (Barry & Friedman, 1998).
Regarding the research model it is expected that Agree-
ableness influences both social preferences and bargaining
behavior.
• H1: Highly agreeable individuals tend to use their struc-
tural power to achieve an equal bargaining outcome.
Extraversion is related to being assertive (Rustichini et
al., 2012), and extraverts have higher influence on group
outcome than introverts (Hutzinger, 2014). Thus, a more
active participation from extraverts is expected. This ac-
tive and information sharing behavior can be advantageous
in integrative but not in distributive bargaining situations
(Barry & Friedman, 1998). According to Sharma, Bottom,
and Elfenbein (2013), extraverts tend to reveal more infor-
mation about their preferences, which can be disadvanta-
geous. Moreover, it is expected that extraverted people tend
to fell for anchoring because “anchoring is more likely to oc-
cur when bargainers are highly concerned with the devel-
opment and maintenance of social ties” (Barry & Friedman,
1998, p. 347). In the literature, there is no evidence that
Extraversion affects social preferences, so only an impact of
bargaining behavior is expected.
• H2: Extraverts are more likely to send first offers than
introverts.
The other three traits (Conscientiousness, Neuroticism,
Openness) are not directly linked with interpersonal behav-
ior, but they influence social decision makings on the periph-
ery and their effects depend on the setting (Zhao & Smillie,
2015). As mentioned earlier, Neuroticism relates to risk at-
titude (Rustichini et al., 2012), but there is no evidence that
it also relates to fairness. Based on the current literature,
Neuroticism does not predict social preferences. Elfenbein
(2015) argued that the traits themselves do not directly in-
fluence bargaining performance, but rather they determine
how negotiators feel. At the end, how well the negotiators
feel will define performance (Elfenbein, 2015). It is expected
that highly neurotic people will suffer under time pressure
and thus, will perform more poorly and will not be able to
enforce their will despite the power position.
• H3: Highly neurotic individuals earn less than lowly neu-
rotic individuals.
Highly conscientious individuals like order and prefer
avoiding uncertainty (Schoen & Schumann, 2007). With
other words, a certain level of norm conformity is expected
and thus, people who score high on Conscientiousness will
not demand a high amount for themselves. Rather, they
adapt to social norms, even when being in power position.
Also, highly conscientious individuals are able to plan ahead
and this pre-negotiation planning and analysis benefits them
(Barry & Friedman, 1998), they will not use their power in a
self-maximizing way. Previous findings about Conscientious-
ness only refer to influence on bargaining behavior but not
on social preferences.
• H4: Highly conscientious individuals tend to use struc-
tural power to achieve a more equal distribution.
High Openness predicts great flexibility and divergent
thinking, which can be beneficial mostly in integrative sit-
uations (Sharma et al., 2013). Oda et al. (2014) found that
Openness predicts altruistic behavior towards strangers with-
out expecting reciprocity. Some papers also discovered co-
operative behavior of highly open people (Zhao & Smillie,
2015). Boyce et al. (2019) concluded that those who scored
high on Openness deviate more easily from the status quo.
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• H5: Highly open individuals are more likely to include
the third network member than less open individuals.
4. Design & methods
4.1. Research properties
As mentioned in the Introduction, this thesis is a sec-
ondary analysis, which means that the experiment was orig-
inally designed to answer another research question. How-
ever, the design enables to examine the role of personality de-
pending on power since a personality test was included in the
questionnaire. Secondary analysis means using secondary
data. Hox and Boeije (2005, p. 593) define secondary data as
“data originally collected for a different purpose and reused
for another research question.” Using secondary data has the
following advantages; it is less costly and time-consuming
that collecting primary data (Hox & Boeije, 2005). Never-
theless, since the data was originally collected for a differ-
ent purpose, secondary data is not always optimal and does
not perfectly fit to the new research question (Hox & Boeije,
2005). As pointed out earlier, a laboratory experiment was
conducted to obtain the primary data (Schwaninger et al.,
2019). Experiments allow strong control over the design, the
procedure, and the whole situation (Falk & Heckman, 2009;
Hox & Boeije, 2005). Thus, casual interpretation of results
is permitted, which leads to strong internal validity (Hox &
Boeije, 2005). Moreover, the level of control provided by
laboratory experiments is hard to reproduce in natural oc-
curring settings (Falk & Heckman, 2009). Nonetheless, lab-
oratory experiments create artificial environment and thus,
generalizability of laboratory experiments is not always the
most persuasive (Hox & Boeije, 2005).
4.2. Design
A two factorial design was created, where a between-
subject design was applied regarding the network structure
and a within-subject design was applied regarding the ex-
change mode (Schwaninger et al., 2019).
As figure 3 shows, subjects negotiated in three-nodes net-
works. Two different power structure was designed: trian-
gle and three-line network (Schwaninger et al., 2019). In
triangle network, all three subjects are connected with each
other, which results in an equal structural power distribution.
Three-line network means that there is one central subject and
two on the periphery. The central subject has structural ad-
vantage since the two peripheral subjects have to compete
with each other in order to agree with the central subject
(Schwaninger et al., 2019). Networks are negatively con-
nected; thus, each subject is allowed to exchange with no
more than one subject at a time (Schwaninger et al., 2019).
As a result, one subject in a three-node network is excluded
from the exchange. In exclusive exchange, also an exclusion
from any payoff is implied (Schwaninger et al., 2019), which
means that the excluded party will receive zero payoff. How-
ever, in inclusive exchange, the third party can be included
(Schwaninger et al., 2019). With other words, the exchang-
ing dyads have the possibility to allocate some payoff to the
third subject, who does not participate in the exchange.
The experiment was conducted at the Vienna Center
for Experimental Economics in April 2016 and March 2018
(Schwaninger et al., 2019) and was programmed in zTree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were recruited with the
help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Upon arrival, subjects were
randomly assigned to their cubicles in the laboratory and
stayed anonymous during the whole session (Schwaninger
et al., 2019).
First, subjects completed an SVO slider task, which was
served as a proxy for fairness preferences (Schwaninger et
al., 2019). SVO slider task was incentivized and ordered an
SVO score to each subject and based on this score, subject
could be categorized (i.e. prosocial or proself) (Schwaninger
et al., 2019). After completing the first part (SVO and risk
aversion measurement), participants were assigned either to
a three-line or a triangle network depending on the treatment,
which stayed constant during the whole session and varied
between subjects (Schwaninger et al., 2019). According to
the restrictions of structure and exchange mode, subjects had
to allocate 24 points within the networks of three and played
10 rounds (Schwaninger et al., 2019). As mentioned ear-
lier, the network structure determined whether someone in
the network had structural power, and the exchange mode
imposed if the excluded party was allowed to receive some
share (inclusive treatment if yes, exclusive treatment if no).
Both inclusive and exclusive treatment were played five con-
secutive times (thus, within-subjects design), and half of the
time the experiment started with inclusive treatment, and in
the other half of the session exclusive treatment came first
(Schwaninger et al., 2019). In every round, agreements
must have been achieved in three minutes, otherwise ev-
ery member within the network would have got zero points
(Schwaninger et al., 2019). At the end, one round of ten was
randomly selected to be relevant for pay-off.
At the end of the experiment, subjects completed the
Big Five 30 item personality inventory (Schwaninger et al.,
2019). This short scale contains 15 items and was developed
as part of the SOEP and is based on the Big Five Inventory by
John, Donahue, and Kentle (1991) (Schupp & Gerlitz, 2008).
Every personality factor was represented by three questions
on a scale from one to seven, where one meaning “does not
apply at all” and seven meaning “does apply fully”. Partici-
pants also filled out a socio-demographic survey and finally,
they were paid in Euros individually in private by labor as-
sistants (Schwaninger et al., 2019). For a more detailed de-
scription of the experiment see Schwaninger et al. (2019).
4.3. Sample
Overall, 12 sessions with 27 subjects were run and a total
of 324 individuals participated (Schwaninger et al., 2019).
Triangle treatment: 162 subjects (50%) participated in
the triangle treatment and 67 (41,36%) were male and 95
(58,64%) female. The mean of the age was 22,96 (∼23)
years, the youngest participant 18 and the oldest 40 years
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Figure 3: Two-factorial design (Schwaninger et al., 2019)
old. 93% of the subjects were younger than 30 years old.
28 subjects studied natural sciences (17,28%), 11 (6,79%)
medical sciences, 25 (15,43%) business or economics, 19
(11,73%) technical studies, 32 (19,75%) human sciences, 45
(27,78%) social sciences, and 2 (1,23%) did not give any
field of study. 115 (70,99%) subjects were from German-
speaking countries (Austria, Germany, Switzerland) and 47
(29,01%) from non-German-speaking countries. Even partic-
ipants from non-German-speaking countries stated that they
have good German knowledge and with the help of control
questions, it was verified that subjects understood the in-
structions.
Three-line treatment: 162 subjects (50%) participated in
the three-line treatment and 69 (42,59%) were male and 93
(57,41%) female. The mean of the age was 24,35 years, the
youngest participant 18 and the oldest 57 years old. 92%
of the subjects were younger than 30 years old. 17 sub-
jects studied natural sciences (10,49%), 10 (6,17%) medical
sciences, 20 (12,35%) business or economics, 24 (14,81%)
technical studies, 45 (27,78%) human sciences, 44 (27,16%)
social sciences, and 2 (1,23%) did not give any field of study.
114 (70,37%) subjects were from German-speaking coun-
tries (Austria, Germany, Switzerland) and 48 (29,63%) from
non-German-speaking countries. Comparing the two sam-
ples, no remarkable difference regarding gender, age, field
of study, and origin is showed. Hence, the potential differ-
ences between the treatments derive from the design, and
treatment effects can be analyzed.
5. Analysis of results
5.1. Descriptive statistics of the input variables
In this part, descriptive statistics of input variables and re-
sults are presented. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics
of the SVO slider task.
Egoistic and competitive individuals both aim to maxi-
mize their own output and in this bargaining situation max-
imizing own output automatically means reducing others’
outcome, so they will be treated as one group since differ-
entiation would not provide additional explanation. Hence,
SVO type will be dichotomy variable: prosocial or proself
(Van Dijk et al. (2004) used the term proself for combining
egoistic and competitive categories). Also, only two subjects
classified as Competitive, which is too law to make signifi-
cant differences. In Table 2, the reliability of the Big Five
constructs is shown.
Although the applied scale is widely used by researchers
in social psychology, economics, and sociology, it is impor-
tant to check the validity and reliability of the scale. Valid-
ity demonstrates if the scale measures what it is supposed
to measure. However, reliability is a prerequisite of validity
and measures the consistency of an instrument. Cronbach’s
Alpha is the most widely used tool to measure reliability and
generally, a Cronbach’s Alpha higher than 0.70 is accepted as
reliable (Schupp & Gerlitz, 2008). Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to notice that Cronbach’s Alpha strongly depends on the
number of items and the traditional limit (α > .70) is deter-
mined for scales with many items (Schupp & Gerlitz, 2008).
The Cronbach’s Alphas presented here closely corresponds to
the values in the inventory of Schupp and Gerlitz (2008). In
the case of Agreeableness, Extraversion, and Conscientious-
ness only a slightly higher Cronbach’s Alpha can be achieved
by deleting any item of the three. By deleting any item of
the construct Neuroticism and Openness, Cronbach’s Alpha
would slightly decrease. Thus, all of fifteen items were kept
and Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the Big Five
factors.
Each of the dimensions has a maximum score of seven
and it was calculated as following: the score of the three
questions belonging to each dimension was added (maxi-
mum is 21) and then divided by three. According to Vangel
(1996), coefficient of variation is calculated as the standard
deviation divided by the mean and shows variability. Each of
the five dimensions demonstrate a considerable variability.
Table 4 shows the correlations between the five dimensions.
The five dimensions show quite weak correlation and the
sample demonstrates similar results to previous researches
(Kanning, 2009). In my thesis, p-value <.05 will be catego-
rized as statistically significant if not stated otherwise.
5.2. Descriptive statistics of the output variables
In this subchapter, descriptive statistics of bargaining re-
sults are presented. Table 5 shows the remaining number of
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: SVO





Table 2: Reliability Big Five






Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Big Five Dimensions
Dimension Mean SD Min Max CV
Agreeableness 5.31 1.01 2 7 .191
Extraversion 4.81 1.23 1.67 7 .256
Neuroticism 4.34 1.30 1 7 .298
Conscientiousness 5.17 1.15 1 7 .222
Openness 5.16 1.13 2.33 7 .219
Table 4: Big Five Dimensions Correlation
∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗ p < .10. (2-tailed)
AGR EXT NEU CON OPE
Agreeableness 1
Extraversion 0.060 1
Neuroticism −0.038 −0.224∗ ∗ ∗ 1
Conscientiousness 0.198∗ ∗ ∗ 0.194∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0046 1
Openness 0.143∗ ∗ ∗ 0.240∗ ∗ ∗ −0.012 0.199∗ ∗ ∗ 1
Table 5: Number of observations by treatments
Triangle Three-line
∑
Exclusive 267/267 270/270 537/537
Inclusive 263/264 267/268 530/532
∑
530/531 537/538
observations and whether an agreement was reached within
the given time.
6 observations were dropped because two offers were ac-
cepted in indistinguishable time within a network, which re-
sulted in an incorrect output file. Further, in five cases, a
subject accepted an offer with zero point dedicated to him.
Since it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a mis-
take happened, these five observations were also excluded
from the sample. Table 6 presents the proportions of equal
and unequal outcomes by mode of exchange and treatment.
Table 7 presents the mean of the final profit distributions
by treatment and mode of exchange. Generally, power-
ful subjects earned significantly more than weak subjects
(Wilcoxon test, p < .01). In exclusive treatment, pow-
erful subjects achieved significantly more than 12 points
(Wilcoxon test, p < .01) and in inclusive treatment, indi-
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Table 6: Proportions of equal and unequal outcomes
Exclusive exchange Inclusive exchange
Triangle Three-line Triangle Three-line
Even two-way
split (12-12-0)
.79 .46 .47 .25
Even three-way
split (8-8-8)
– - .24 .28
Uneven two-
way split
.21 .54 .15 .25
Uneven three-
way split
– – .14 .22
Two-way split 1 1 .62 .50
Three-way split – – .38 .50
Table 7: Mean of profit distributions by treatment and mode of exchange
Triangle Three-line
Powerful Weak
Exclusive 8 13.485 5.257
Inclusive 7.970 11.648 6.090
viduals in power position earned significantly more than 8
points (Wilcoxon test, p < .01). Between the two modes of
exchange, the difference is rather moderate and not statisti-
cally significant.
5.3. Pre-negotiations assumptions
In order to discover the relationship between the five per-
sonality dimensions and pre-negotiation preferences, a logis-
tic regression was carried out. Table 8 summarizes the re-
sults.
Out of the five dimensions, only Agreeableness and Con-
scientiousness have statistically significant impact on SVO
type. The coefficient of Agreeableness says that while hold-
ing the other four dimensions constant, for one-unit increase
in Agreeableness a .297 decrease in the log odds of SVO type
is expected. In the case of Conscientiousness, for a one-unit
increase in Conscientiousness a 0.376 increase in the log odds
of SVO type is expected, while the other four dimensions stay
at a fixed value. Thus, if a subject is more agreeable then
the odds of being egoistic are decreasing (with other words:
the odds of being prosocial are increasing) and if a subject
is more conscientious then the odds of being egoistic are in-
creasing.
5.4. Assumptions of bargaining situations
In this section, the following aspects of bargaining will be
analyzed: first offers, including the third party, and negotia-
tion outcomes. Altogether, 7653 offers were sent during the
12 sessions and 2654 qualified as first offer. An offer counts
as first offer if it is the first sent offer between a dyad in one
period. For example, Player 1 sent an offer to Player 2 – qual-
ifies as a first offer, the offer Player 2 sent back to Player 1
in the same period does not count as a first offer, but a coun-
teroffer. However, if Player 1 send an offer to Player 3 in
the same period, it qualifies as a first offer. Furthermore, it
is distinguished between even and uneven first offers. Un-
even first offers are supposed to represent extreme first of-
fers, which could cause anchoring. Next, it will be analyzed
if the third party was included in the allocation or not (of
course only if the mode of exchange was inclusive). During
the 12 sessions, half of the subjects started with exclusive
mode of exchange and the other half with inclusive mode of
exchange. Thus, it is possible to control for status quo bias.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) showed that individuals
disproportionally prefer to maintain the current state (status
quo). With other words, individuals prefer to obtain what
they have compared to what they could have and personality
influences how strong an individual’s preferences is for main-
taining the status quo (Boyce et al., 2019). If exclusive mode
of exchanged is played first, the default value is defined by
allocation is dyads and presumably, some people find it hard
to deviate from the status quo, which would explain why the
third party is not included. In order to discover of the possible
impact of status quo bias, a Chi-squared test was conducted
with a result of a X 2 = 37.4895 and a p-value of .000. Hence,
the null hypothesis, which says that including the third net-
work member is independent of which mode of exchange is
implemented first, is rejected. Thus, it is concluded that the
order of exchange mode cannot be neglected. Ultimately, the
final allocations will be evaluated. First, the results of the tri-
angle treatment (without powerful subject) are presented.
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Table 8: Logistic regression: SVO – Big Five
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)







Table 9: Logistic regression: First offer – Big Five (triangle)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)







5.4.1. Bargaining without powerful subject (triangle treat-
ment)
Table 9 presents the results of a logistic regression of
sending first offers in the triangle treatment. None of the
five dimensions have statistically significant effect on sending
first offers in triangle treatment. Thus, H2 is not supported by
this treatment, since extraverts tend not to send more first of-
fers than introverts. Moreover, with equal power distribution
no personality dimensions influence the tendency for sending
first offers. Table 10 shows the results of the equal first offer
in triangle treatment.
Openness is the only dimension that has statistically sig-
nificant impact on sending equal first offers in triangle treat-
ment. Keeping the other four dimensions constant, for a one-
unit increase in Openness a 0.256 increase in the log odds of
sending equal first offer is expected. Although this was not
hypothesized, sending equal first offers fits well to the theory,
which says that highly open individuals show altruistic ten-
dencies toward strangers. Furthermore, unequal offers are
divided in two categories: 1) unequal for own benefit 2) un-
equal for other’s benefit. The outcome of a logistic regression
of sending unequal first offer for the own or other’s benefit is
displayed in Table 11.
As before, only Openness has statistically significant im-
pact on sending unequal first offers. Highly open individuals
are more likely to send altruistic first offers, which benefit
others since for a one-unit increase in Openness, a 1.138 de-
crease in the log odds of sending unequal first offers of own
benefit is expected. Table 12 demonstrates the result of a lo-
gistic regression of including the third party in triangle treat-
ment if subjects faced with inclusive mode of exchange first.
In this case, no status quo bias can occur since subjects ini-
tially are allowed to involve the third player in the allocation
(only first offers were considered, so anchoring effects are
excluded).
Agreeableness, Neuroticism, and Openness show statis-
tically significant impact on including the party in triangle
treatment. In the case of Agreeableness (Neuroticism), for
unit-increase, an increase of .588 (.313) in the log odds is ex-
pected, which indicates a positive relationship; highly agree-
able and neurotic subjects tend to include the third player
in triangle treatment when inclusive mode of exchange is
played in the first five rounds. Openness, on the other hand,
has a negative effect on including the third in the alloca-
tion, which implies that highly open individuals rather not
include the third player. Hence, H5 is not supported. Table
13 demonstrates the same analysis but in those cases, where
subjects could not include the third player of the network in
the first five rounds and so, status quo bias could occur.
Every dimension has statistically significant effect, apart
from Agreeableness and Openness, on including the third
party in triangle treatment when no status quo bias can oc-
cur. Since Openness does not have a statistically significant
effect on including the third player in the first offer, H5 is
not supported in triangle treatment when starting with ex-
clusive mode of exchange. Highly extraverted, neurotic, and
conscientious subjects are more likely not to include the third
player and agree in a two-way split in their first offer.
For analyzing the outcomes, five new dummy variables
were created: for each of five dimensions subjects were cate-
gorized either high or low. If a subject scored more than the
mean of the sample in a given dimension he was categorized
as high, and if less than as low in that given dimension. Stu-
dent’s t-test was carried out for each personality factor, but
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Table 10: Logistic regression: Equal first offer – Big Five (triangle)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)







Table 11: Logistic regression: Unequal first offer – Big Five (triangle)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Unequal first offer (0=if







Table 12: Logistic regression: Including third, no SQB – Big Five (triangle)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Including the third, no SQB






Table 13: Logistic regression: Including third, SQB – Big Five (triangle)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Including the third, SQB






only the significant ones are presented here. Table 14 shows
the results of Student’s t-test of extraversion in the triangle
treatment with exclusive mode of exchange.
The result shows that introverted subjects earn more than
one point less than extraverted subjects and this difference is
statistically significant. Thus, it is assumed that extraverted
people are better at negotiating and can achieve higher out-
come for themselves. No statistically significant differences
were observed in the case of the other four personality di-
mensions in triangle treatment with exclusive mode of ex-
change. Table 15 presents the result of Student’s t-test of
Neuroticism in triangle treatment with inclusive mode of ex-
change.
Highly neurotic individuals earn less than lowly neurotic
individuals. It is important to note that it is only significant
if the chosen α = 0.10 is. Hence, there is only weak evi-
L. Tolnai / Junior Management Science 6(2) (2021) 299-323314
Table 14: Student’s t-test: Payoff-Extraversion (triangle, exclusive)
Mean Alternative hypotheses p-value
Introverted 7.322 Ha1: diff < 0 .0046
Extraverted 8.57 Ha2: diff != 0 .0091
Difference −1.248 Ha3: diff > 0 0.995
Table 15: Student’s t-test: Payoff-Neuroticism (triangle, inclusive)
Mean Alternative hypotheses p-value
Low on Neu-
roticism
8.233 Ha1: diff < 0 .9283
High on Neu-
roticism
7.616 Ha2: diff != 0 .1433
Difference 0.6168 Ha3: diff > 0 0.0717
dence against the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative
hypothesis. However, I included this test statistic since it fits
to the literature and supports H3, and no other personality
dimensions show statistically significant difference.
5.4.2. Bargaining with powerful subject (three-line treat-
ment)
Table 16 presents the results of a logistic regression be-
tween sending first offer and the five personality dimensions
in three-line treatment for powerful subject.
Three factors have statistically significant impact on send-
ing first offers (Extraversion, Neuroticism, Conscientious-
ness). For one-unit increase in Extraversion and Neuroticism,
a decrease of 0.157 and .108 in the log odds of sending the
first offer is expected. Thus, highly extraverted and neurotic
subjects in power position rather not send the first offer. This
contradicts H2, which is not supported in any treatment. On
the other hand, for one-unit increase in Conscientiousness,
0.160 increases in the log odds is expected, hence, highly
conscious individuals have a tendency to send the first offer.
Table 17 presents the same analysis, but for weak subjects.
Openness is the only dimension that has statistically sig-
nificant impact on sending first offers from a weak position.
The relationship is negative; thus, highly open individuals do
not have a tendency for sending first offer from a weak posi-
tion. H2 is not supported by the data in this treatment either.
Table 18 demonstrates the logistic regression of sending even
first offers in three-line treatment by powerful subjects.
Extraversion and Neuroticism have a statistically signifi-
cant impact on sending even first offers from power position.
For a one-unit increase in Extraversion (Neuroticism), 0.351
(0.320) decrease of the log odds of sending even first offers
are expected. Hence, highly extraverted and neurotic people
have a tendency to send uneven first offers. Table 19 presents
the same analysis but for weak subjects.
Only Extraversion has statistically significant impact on
sending even first offers from a weak position. It is predicted
that extraverted subjects have a tendency to send unequal
first offers even from weak position. Just like in triangle
treatment, it was differentiated between unequal first offers
for own or other’s benefit. Only three subjects sent a first
offer which benefits others from a powerful position and sta-
tistically no significant results are not displayed in table, so
Table 20 shows the results of the same analysis for subjects
in weak position.
Statistically significant impact on sending unequal first
offers from a weak position is only shown by Agreeableness.
For one-unit increase in the scale of Agreeableness, a .413
decrease in the log odds of sending first offers of own benefit
is expected and thus, highly Agreeable people demonstrate
an altruistic behavior; if they send an unequal first offer, it is
rather unequal for others’ benefit rather than favoring them-
selves. Table 21 demonstrates the result of a logistic regres-
sion of including the third party in three-line treatment from
power position if subjects faced with inclusive mode of ex-
change first (no status quo bias).
Statistically significant impact is shown by two dimen-
sions: Extraversion and Neuroticism. Both have negative ef-
fect (since for a one-unit increase in the personality dimen-
sion, decrease in the log odds is expected), which means that
highly extraverted and neurotic individuals in powerful po-
sition are less like to include the third party, even when no
status quo bias could occur. The same analysis was carried
out for weak subjects without statistically significant effect,
so the results are not presented here. Furthermore, a logistic
regression of including the third party in three-line treatment
from power position if subjects faced with exclusive mode of
exchange first (status quo bias) was conducted but no sig-
nificant results were shown. Finally, the same analysis was
carried out from weak position (Table 22).
Conscientiousness and Openness (only if α = .10) have
statistically significant impact on including the third party
from a weak position if inclusive mode of exchange is played
in the last five rounds. Both highly conscious and highly open
subjects rather include the third, therefore, H5 is partly sup-
ported.
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Table 16: Logistic regression: First offer – Big Five (three-line, powerful)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)







Table 17: Logistic regression: First offer – Big Five (three-line, weak)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)







Table 18: Logistic regression: Even first offer – Big Five (three-line, powerful)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)







Table 19: Logistic regression: Even first offer – Big Five (three-line, weak)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)







Ultimately, Student’s t-test was carried out for each of the
five personality dimensions, in order to see whether person-
ality factors cause significant difference in the final outcomes
(of course, it was differentiated between mode of exchange
and position when calculating the averages). Only the sta-
tistically significant results are presented. Table 23 presents
the result of Student’s t-test of Neuroticism in three-line treat-
ment with exclusive mode of exchange in power position.
Student’s t-test demonstrates a significant difference in
earning of highly and lowly neurotic subjects in power posi-
tion with exclusive mode of exchange. Less neurotic subjects
earn almost with one point more than highly neurotic sub-
jects. Consequently, people low on Neuroticism can better
use their structural power in exclusive mode of exchange and
thus, H3 is supported. No significant difference was found
for any other personality dimensions. The same test was
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Table 20: Logistic regression: Unequal first offer – Big Five (three-line, weak)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Unequal first offer (0=if







Table 21: Logistic regression: Including third, no SQB – Big Five (three-line, powerful)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Including the third, no SQB






Table 22: Logistic regression: Including third, SQB – Big Five (three-line, weak)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Including the third, no SQB












13.92 Ha1: diff < 0 .9850
High on Neu-
roticism
12.99 Ha2: diff != 0 .0299
Difference 0.93 Ha3: diff > 0 .0150
conducted for subjects in weak position in exclusive mode of
exchange, but again; no statistically significant results were
found. Further, inclusive mode of exchange was tested too.
Table 24 demonstrate the results of Student’s t-test of Con-
scientiousness in three-line treatment with inclusive mode of
exchange in power position.
Student’s t-test reveals statistically significant difference
between the mean earnings of highly and lowly conscious in-
dividuals in power position with inclusive mode of exchange.
Less conscious individuals earn 1.403 points more than more
conscious subjects. Hence, highly conscious individuals use
their power for a more equal distribution and thus, H4 is sup-
ported. Finally, the same analysis was carried out for weak
subjects, but no significant difference was found for weak
subjects in inclusive mode of exchange.
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12.342 Ha1: diff < 0 .9926
High on Consci-
entiousness
10.939 Ha2: diff != 0 .0148
Difference 1.403 Ha3: diff > 0 .0074
5.4.3. The mediating role of social preferences
In order to discover the mediating role of social prefer-
ences proposed in the research model the same tests and re-
gressions were conducted as before, but controlled for SVO
type. In order to control whether personality predicts social
preferences, a logistic regression was conducted (Table 25).
Table 25 reveals that two dimensions (Agreeableness
and Conscientiousness) have statistically significant impact
on the SVO type and thus, it is concluded that personality
predicts social preferences. The effect of the two statisti-
cally significant dimensions is contrary: for one unit increase
in Agreeableness (Conscientiousness), .297 (.376) decrease
(increase) in the log odds is expected. Hence, Agreeableness
predicts prosocial preferences and Conscientiousness antici-
pates egoistic social preferences. Results revealed that SVO
type has no statistically significant impact on sending first
offers or sending (un)equal first offers. However, regardless
of the treatment and the possible status quo bias, SVO type
significantly influence including the third player. Table 26
presents the results of the logistic regression of including the
third in the triangle treatment with no SQB.
The logistic regression reveals that prosocial individuals
are more likely to include the third network member. Com-
paring this table to Table 12 (which presents the same logistic
regression without SVO type), the three statistically signifi-
cant dimensions remained significant, but their coefficients
slightly decreased. Furthermore, the Pseudo R2 slightly in-
creased (from 0.0836 to 0.0949) in this regression compared
to the previous one. The Pseudo R2 indicates which model
predicts better the outcome and the higher the R2 the bet-
ter the model’s prediction power. Table 27 presents the same
analysis but starting with exclusive mode of exchange.
Comparing the results to Table 13, it is shown that Ex-
traversion lost its significance and the Pseudo R2 increased
(from 0.0733 to 0.1955). As expected, egoistic individuals
are less likely to include the third party in the allocation when
the sessions started with exclusive mode of exchange than
prosocial individuals. Thus, prosocial individuals do not have
strong preferences for maintaining the status quo. The same
analysis was carried out for the three-line treatment both for
powerful and weak position. Table 28 demonstrates the re-
sults of the logistic regression of including the third network
member from a powerful position with no possible SQB.
As before, the Pseudo R2 increased from 0.1582 to
0.2163, compared to the model without SVO type (Table
21). The log odds of Neuroticism decreased in the model
with SVO type compared to the model with SVO type. The
same analysis was conducted for weak subjects but no sta-
tistically significant impact was found. Finally, the logistic
regression was carried out when the session started with ex-
clusive mode of exchange. Statistically significant effect was
found only for subjects in weak position but no for subjects
in powerful position and the results are presented in Table
29.
Compared to the model without including the SVO type
(Table 22) an increase in the Pseudo R2 is revealed from
0.1216 to 0.1765. In each case, SVO type is the most power-
ful predictor for including the third player in the allocation.
Regardless of the treatment and mode of exchange, prosocial
individuals are more likely to include the third than egoistic
ones.
5.5. Summary
Table 30 is devoted to summarize which hypotheses are
supported by the data.
6. Discussion
In this chapter, the results are discussed in context of the
existing economics and social psychology literature on per-
sonality. First, a general overview of the role of personality
in bargaining situations is provided then each of the five per-
sonality dimensions and their relationship with social prefer-
ences are discussed in depth.
6.1. General Discussion
Summarized, there are clear signs that personality in-
fluences social preferences and bargaining behavior but the
results are rather inconsistent. Two personality dimensions
(Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) indicate social pref-
erences, four personality dimensions (Agreeableness, Ex-
traversion, Neuroticism, and Conscientiousness) influence
the ability to use structural power. The relationship between
Openness and including the third is almost fully mediated by
SVO types. The role of SVO types in including the third party
fits well to the findings of Schwaninger et al. (2019) who
found that social value orientation has explanatory power
on the outcome only in inclusive mode of exchange.
A possible explanation for the ambiguous results is that
personality expression varies on computer (Blumer & Döring,
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Table 26: Logistic regression: Including the third, no SQB – Big Five+SVO (triangle)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Including the third, no SQB






SVO type −.546 .004
Table 27: Logistic regression: Including the third, SQB – Big Five+SVO (triangle)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Including the third, no SQB






SVO type −1.936 .000
Table 28: Logistic regression: Including the third, no SQB – Big Five+SVO (three-line, powerful)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Including the third, no SQB






SVO type −1.831 .005
2012). It is important to emphasize that not personality itself
varies, which is stable by definition, but the expression of per-
sonality. According to Stritzke, Nguyen, and Durkin (2004),
shyness (which is part of the Extraversion scale) is expressed
weaker in online settings. With other words, introverted in-
dividuals become more sociable if the communication hap-
pens on computer (Blumer & Döring, 2012). Not only in-
troverts benefit from an online, anonym setting; research of
Rice and Markey (2009) states that highly neurotic individu-
als feel less anxious communicating on computers than face-
to-face.
Furthermore, taking personal values in consideration
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Table 29: Logistic regression: Including the third, SQB – Big Five+SVO (three-line, weak)
Coefficient p-value (2-tailed)
Including the third, no SQB






SVO type −1.362 .002
Table 30: Summary
Hypothesis Finding
H1: Highly agreeable individuals tend to use their structural power to
achieve an equal bargaining outcome.
not supported
H2: Extraverts are more likely to send first offers than introverts. not supported
H3: Highly neurotic individuals earn less than lowly neurotic individuals. supported
H4: Highly conscientious individuals tend to use their structural power to
achieve a more equal distribution.
supported
H5: Highly open individuals are more likely to include the third network
member than less open individuals.
partly supported
provides deeper understanding of behavior. According to
Schwartz (2012), values represent desirable and abstract
goals, which motivate actions. Schwartz (2012) proposed
ten types of values each expressing a motivational goal. Just
like traits, values also show relative stability during time
(Roccas et al., 2002). Furthermore, Roccas et al. (2002)
linked the values to personality traits saying that they mu-
tually influence each other. Since “values serve as ideals or
oughts and hence guides for self-regulation”, people aim to
adapt their behavior according to their values (Roccas et al.,
2002, p. 791). Basic values seem to play a crucial role in




Literature predicted altruistic attitude of highly agreeable
people (Zhao & Smillie, 2015), which is supported by data
and Agreeableness predicts prosocial social value orientation.
Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, and Kosse (2012) also found
that Agreeableness predicts altruistic preferences. Moreover,
highly agreeable individuals show a tendency to include the
third player in the allocation. However, the outcomes of bar-
gaining situations do no support H1 and there is no statis-
tically significant difference between the profit distributions
of highly and lowly agreeable people. Thus, it is concluded
that highly agreeable individuals cannot use their structural
power to achieve an even distribution. Even though they
have a preference for equal outcomes, they rather go with
the flow and accept others’ offers. The findings of this thesis
match well to the discovery of Barry and Friedman (1998);
Agreeableness appears to be a liability in distributive bar-
gaining situations. Highly agreeable individuals are at risk
for not enforcing their own will and accepting an outcome,
which is not so favorable for them. People high on Agreeable-
ness try to avoid conflicts since inter-personal relationships
are very important to them (De Dreu & Gross, 2019) and
as a result, a people-pleasing attitude is observable and they
give up their own interest. Another possible explanation for
the inconsistent results derives from the findings of Hilbig et
al. (2014): Honesty-Humility dimension (see Chapter 2.3.2)
has stronger explanatory power on prosocial behavior than
Agreeableness.
6.2.2. Extraversion
Extraversion does not predict any pre-negotiation pref-
erences. Furthermore, there is no sign that extraverted are
more active and initiative than introverted and so, H2 is not
supported by the data. Just like Agreeableness, Extraversion
also directly relates to interpersonal relationships but con-
trary to Agreeableness, cooperative behavior of extraverted
people is often driven by the expectation of reciprocity and
not by altruism (Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Although Extraver-
sions does not indicate tendency for sending first offers, it
does predict the likeliness of sending unequal first offers
favoring themselves. Moreover, Extraversion decreases the
willingness of including the third party in the allocation.
Hence, highly extraverted individuals can be categorized as
tough negotiator, who try to achieve an agreement in the
dyad and thus, reach a high payoff for them. These find-
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ings match well to the results of Koole et al. (2001), who
noted a negative relationship between Extraversion and co-
operation. Since extraverted people earned significantly
more in triangle treatment with exclusive mode of exchange
than introverted, it is concluded that extraverts utilize their
assertiveness successfully in bargaining situations and Ex-
traversion affects bargaining behavior. As mentioned in the
General Discussion, Extraversion is one of the most sensitive
dimensions in terms of its online expression and thus, it is
possible that the difference between extraverts and intro-
verts was less notable during a laboratory experiment on
computers.
6.2.3. Neuroticism
In the case of Neuroticism, no pre-negotiation prefer-
ences are anticipated. As hypothesized, highly neurotic indi-
viduals earn significantly less than subjects who scored less
on the scale of Neuroticism, so H3 is supported. However,
highly neurotic individuals apply tough negotiation styles;
they are more likely to send uneven first offers and do not
want to include the third party in inclusive mode of exchange.
These signs suggest a rather self-maximizing preference, but
based on the lower payoff, it is concluded that highly neu-
rotic people are unable to use structural power. Ma (2005)
stated that highly neurotic individuals are prone to find con-
flicts threating and decide to rather avoid them. Avoiding
conflicts could result in lower payoff since highly neurotic
individuals rather accept offers than demand higher payoff
for themselves. According to Sharma et al. (2013, p. 303),
highly neurotic “negotiator may struggle to engage the task
and their relationship partners”, which potentially leads to
disadvantages in outcome.
6.2.4. Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness predicts egoistic social value orienta-
tion. Moreover, signs of initiation are shown, which fits well
to the careful and planning behavior predicted by literature.
Based on the egoistic preferences and careful preparation, it
was expected that highly conscientious individuals are able
to use their structural power and achieve higher outcome for
themselves. However, results show that highly conscientious
people earn less in power position than lowly conscientious
individuals and do not send unequal first offers benefitting
them, which means that H4 is supported. Summarized, it is
concluded that highly conscientious individuals respect the
norms so much that they behave against their preferences.
A possible explanation of this behavior derives from the link
between personality traits and personal values. Roccas et al.
(2002) found that Conscientiousness positively, strongly, and
significantly relates with achievement and conformity values.
Schwartz (2012, p. 5) determines the demonstrating goal
of achievement values as “personal success through demon-
strating competence according to social standards”. Achieve-
ment values belong to individual values and hence, they po-
tentially explain egoistic social preferences. On the other
hand, “conformity values emphasize self-restraint in every-
day interaction” Schwartz (2012, p. 6), which potentially
lead to retain egoistic preferences and balance the behavior
of highly conscientious individuals. According to Schwartz
(2012), the promoted cooperative behavior by conformity
values is motivated by avoiding negative outcome for self and
not by internalized motives.
6.2.5. Openness
In case of Openness, the results are highly inconsistent.
H5 is partially supported because in some treatment and
mode of exchange highly open people are more likely to in-
clude the third network member than less open individuals.
However, in other treatment and mode of exchange highly
open humans are less likely to include the third party. Fur-
thermore, Openness partially predicts altruistic behavior, but
it is not consistent. Regarding including the network mem-
ber, it is plausible to say that SVO types explain whether
someone decides to include the third or not and thus, Open-
ness has no significant explanatory power on including the
third. In addition, Openness positively and significantly cor-
relates with every dimension besides Neuroticism (Table 3),
which potentially also weakens the explanatory power of
Openness.
7. Conclusion
The ultimate goal of the present Master’s thesis was to
shed light on the role of personality in social decision-making
situations. It was intended to combine two already existing
but distinct approaches: how personality influences social
preferences and the impact of personality on individual in-
fluence in bargaining situations. Hence, the major scientific
contribution of this thesis is how the link between personality
traits and bargaining behavior is mediated by social prefer-
ences. In this Chapter, theoretical and practical significance
of the thesis in along with the limitations of the study and
future research direction are discussed.
7.1. Theoretical and practical significance
The findings of the present study extents current liter-
ature at least in two ways; first, contrary to previous re-
searches about the role of personality and bargaining behav-
ior in economic games where dyads were studied, in this
case, the focus was on triads and behavior in networks of
three were analyzed. Networks of three created a competi-
tion between subjects to be in the agreeing dyad, which pre-
sumably affected bargaining process and provided additional
information about individual influence. The second scien-
tific contribution of the thesis is the combination of the two,
above mentioned aspects and the proposition of the research
model (Fig. 2), where social preferences mediate the rela-
tionship between personality and bargaining behavior. Com-
plementary evidences to Dohmen et al. (2008) and Hilbig
et al. (2014) are provided, who also found that personality
traits have an impact on social preferences. Moreover, this
thesis supports that personality influences negotiation pro-
cess and outcome, which was proposed by Barry and Fried-
man (1998), McCannon and Stevens (2017), and Elfenbein
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(2015). However, to the best of my knowledge, no other sci-
entific research has examined the impact of personality on
social preferences and bargaining behavior at the same time.
Thus, the present study contributes to the scientific literature
by revealing the mediating role of social preferences.
In addition to the presented contribution to the scien-
tific literature, the current study also provides significant im-
plications for human resources management and organiza-
tional behavior. Personality already has been linked to job
performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991) and to personnel se-
lection (Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). Based on the findings
of the present thesis, it is supported that managers and hu-
man resource professionals should consider personality at se-
lecting personnel. For example, highly conscientious individ-
uals seem to be a better choice for time-sensitive job than
highly neurotic individuals, who suffer from time pressure.
Moreover, highly neurotic people seem not to be able to use
structural power, which indicates that selecting lowly neu-
rotic people for a management position would be more ben-
eficial. As it has been pointed out earlier, self-managed work-
ing groups have become more and more popular (Greenberg
& Baron, 2008). Individual influence plays a crucial role both
in self-managed working groups where members do not dif-
fer in terms of power position. It is expected that extraverted
individuals will be more influential than introverts and thus,
it is important to monitor that introverts also have the pos-
sibility to use their knowledge in group decisions. However,
extraverts and highly conscientious individuals suit better for
distributive negotiation situation than highly agreeable or
neurotic people.
7.2. Limitations and future research
Even though the thesis provides many important theoreti-
cal and empirical suggestions and implications, the limitation
of the study must be noted too.
As it has been already pointed out, the expression of per-
sonality is influenced by the communication channel. Rice
and Markey (2009) found that Neuroticism is strongly af-
fected by whether the communication happen face-to-face or
via computer. Additionally, a second dimension – Extraver-
sion – has been shown to be influenced by the mode of com-
munication; when the communication happens via comput-
ers, the difference between extraverts and introverts is less
salient (Blumer & Döring, 2012). Therefore, it is expected
that communicating face-to-face would result in a relatively
more active participation and stronger influence of extraverts
compared to introverts.
Furthermore, it is expected that the Honesty-Humility di-
mension of the HEXACO model would explain what the FFM
Agreeableness was not able to. Based on previous researches
(Hilbig et al., 2014), applying the HEXACO model shows
more consistent results regarding altruism and thus, further
research using HEXACO is supported.
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